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6

STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the trial court properly awarded judgment
interest from the date of the prior judgment that was reversed on
appeal instead of from the date of the new judgment following
remand?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-respondent Cleo B. Mason originally filed
this action against defendant-appellant Western Mortgage Loan
Corporation (Western) for unauthorized disbursement of
construction loan funds.

In the original trial, the trial court

found unauthorized disbursements, but dismissed the action
because Mason had failed to prove that the disbursements had not
been applied to the construction. (R. 71-72, 83-84; Add. 1-4.)
This Court reversed, concluding that Mason had satisfied her
burden of proving damages, and remanded for calculation of those
damages. Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp., 705 P.2d 1179
(Utah 1985) (Mason I) (Add. 5-7).
On remand the trial court heard arguments on damages
and entered judgment for Mason, with interest from the date of
the original judgment for Western instead of from the date of the
new judgment. (R. 184; Add. 8-9.)

Western appealed both the

calculation of damages and the award of judgment interest. (R.
192.)

The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition,
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and this Court affirmed the award of damages but declined to rule
summarily on the interest issue. (Add. 10.)

Thus, the sole

remaining issue on this appeal is whether the trial court
properly allowed interest from the date of the original judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1977 Mason, a real estate developer, entered into
two loan agreements with Western under which Western was to
provide funds totaling $54,159 for construction of two houses.
Western construed the loan agreements to allow disbursements by
authorization of either Mason or her contractor.

Accordingly,

while most of the loan funds were disbursed upon authorization by
both Mason and the contractor, approximately $29,000 was
disbursed at the contractor's sole request and without express
authorization from Mason.

The loan funds did not cover the total

costs of construction, and Mason paid the completion costs outof-pocket.

Mason I, supra, 705 P.2d at 1179-80.

Subsequently, Mason sued Western alleging that the
disbursement of construction funds without her authorization
violated the loan agreements and caused her to incur the
completion expenses above the loan amounts.

Western responded

that its disbursement procedure was authorized by the agreements
and that, in any event, all the disbursements had been used in
construction of the houses and none of the money had been
diverted to other uses.

On October 14, 1982, the trial court
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ruled in favor of Western.

The court found that while Western

had made some disbursements not authorized by Masonf those
disbursements would violate the loan agreements only if the money
was not used for materials or labor on the houses.

The court

found that Mason had failed to prove any of the unauthorized
payments were diverted from the houses; therefore, the court
concluded that Mason had suffered no damage and dismissed the
action. (R. 71-72, 83-84; Add. 1-4.)
Mason appealed the trial court's judgment, and this
Court reversed.

Mason I, supra, Add. 5.

This Court reasoned

that while Western had the option under the loan agreements of
isbursing funds directly to the contractor, Western also had the
ob i ation to ensure that all such disbursements were for work
done or materials furnished and incorporated into the houses.
Therefore, the Court held that Mason satisfied her burden of
proving damages once she established the $29,000 of unauthorized
disbursements.

She was not required to prove how much of those

disbursements was actually diverted; rather, the burden was on
Western to prove that the funds were not diverted, but were used
for Mason's benefit.1 The Court remanded for entry of judgment in
Mason's favor in the amount of funds wrongfully disbursed less
any amount Mason conceded or Western established was used to
Mason's benefit. Mason I, 705 P.2d at 1180-81. The Court made no
mention of interest on the judgment.
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On remand, Mason conceded that all but $15,380 of the
unauthorized disbursements had been used in construction of the
houses.

Mason proposed a judgment in that amount, plus more than

three-years interest on the judgment from the date of the trial
court's original judgment in favor of Western (October 14,
1982).

(R. 146-49.)

Western objected to the proposed judgment

on the grounds that (1) it failed to account for Western's
evidence that all the disbursements were used on the houses; that
Mason's damage was caused by accepting an excessively low bid;
and that, in no event, could damages exceed Mason's out-of-pocket
completion costs of $14,184; and (2) interest on the judgment
could be allowed only from the date of its entry.

(R. 134-45.)

On January 31, 1986, the trial court entered judgment for Mason
in the principal amount requested, plus nearly $7,000 of interest
from the date of the original judgment for Western. (R. 184; Add.
8-9.)
... This time Western appealed, asserting that the trial
court's calculation of damages and award of interest were
erroneous.

(R. 192.)

Both parties moved for summary disposition

on those issues. On July 30, 1986, the Court summarily affirmed
the trial court's award of damages but declined to rule on the
interest issue, leaving that sole issue for this appeal:
"Appellant is limited to the issue of whether the trial court
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properly allowed interest from the date of the entry of the
previous judgment." (Add. 10.) SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The general rule is that interest on a judgment accrues
only from the date of entry of that judgment.

Accordingly, when

a judgment is reversed on appeal with the direction to the trial
court to calculate damages and enter judgment for the appellant,
and no mention is made of prejudgment interest, the new judgment
bears interest only from the date of its entry.

Mason is not

entitled to prejudgment interest because liability and the fact
of loss were not established until Mason I; the extent of damages
was not fixed until after the hearing on remand? and Western
engaged in no unreasonable delay in paying the obligation.

While

this appears to be a case of first impression in Utah, federal
courts and other state courts have uniformly held that when a
judgment is reversed on appeal, it is extinguished and the remand
judgment bears interest only from the date it is entered, not
from the date of the original judgment.
ARGUMENT
WHEN A JUDGMENT IS REVERSED ON APPEAL AND THE CASE IS
REMANDED FOR CALCULATION OF DAMAGES, THE NEW JUDGMENT
ENTERED ON REMAND BEARS INTEREST ONLY FROM THE DATE OF ITS
ENTRY, NOT FROM THE DATE OF THE PRIOR EXTINGUISHED JUDGMENT.
In Utah, interest on judgments is permitted by statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1953). (Add. 11.)

The general rule

regarding accrual of judgment interest is that interest runs from
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the date of entry of the judgment.

Rule 54(e), Utah R. Civ. P.,

states that interest on a judgment is to run "from the time it
was rendered." (Add. 12.)

See also Dairy Distributors, Inc. v.

Local Union 976, 16 Utah 2d 85, 396 P.2d 47 (1964); Schippers v.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 30 Utah 2d 404, 518 P.2d 1099
(1974); 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Interest and Usury §§ 59-60 (1969).

This

general rule governs the award of interest on the judgment in
this case.

f

•*•

"

Rule 32, Utah R. Appellate Proc, governing interest on
appealed judgments, is consistent with this rule.

It provides:

Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in
a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by
law shall be payable from the date the judgment was entered
in the district court. [Add. 13, emp. added.]
Under the terms of this Rule, Mason's 1986 judgment may not bear
interest from the date of Western's 1982 judgment because the
1982 judgment was not a "judgment for money" and it was not
"affirmed" on appeal.

Rather, Mason's money judgment, which this

Court summarily affirmed, may bear interest only from the date
that judgment was entered.
While this Court has not previously construed U.R.A.P.
32, federal court construction of its counterpart in the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 37, is persuasive. F.R.A.P. 37
provides that if a judgment is reversed with a direction for the
trial court to enter a money judgment, interest may be awarded
only as specified in the mandate. (Add. 14.)

The rule is based
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on the Supreme Court's ruling in Briggs v. Pennsylvania, 334 U.S.
304 (1948), that if the appellate court in reversing a judgment
is silent as to the award of judgment interest following remand,
the trial court has no authority to exact interest from the date
of the first judgment.

Thusf where, as in the present case, a

judgment is reversed and remanded for calculation of damages and
entry of judgment, without mention of judgment interest, federal
courts allow interest only from the date of the new, post-appeal
judgment.

See, e.g., Gele v. Wilson, 616 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir.

1980) (party obtaining reversal and seeking interest has burden
to see that appellate mandate so directs); Riha v. International
Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 533 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1976); 2
Fed. Proc, L.Ed. § 3:759 (1981).
This Court's previous cases that allow prejudgment
interest under certain narrowly defined circumstances are
distinguishable from this case. This Court has defined
"prejudgment interest" as money awarded "due to the opposing
party's delay in tendering the amount owing under an obligation."
L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Construction Co., 608 P.2d 626,
629 (Utah 1980).

However, prejudgment interest is allowable only

where liability for a loss and the extent of the loss are fixed
as of a particular time and the amount of that loss can be
calculated with mathematical accuracy as of that time. See,
e.g., Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co.,660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah
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1983); Lyon v, Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480
P.2d 739, 745 (1971), overruled on other grounds, 701 P.2d 795,
798 (1985).

Prejudgment interest may not be awarded where

damages are incomplete or where liability and the calculation of
damages are uncertain, and the obligor has not delayed unjustly
in paying amounts due.

See, e.g., Bjork v. April Industries,

Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977); Lyon, supra, 480 P.2d at
745; Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, 15
(1977).

Accordingly, this Court has allowed prejudgment interest

only in limited cases.

For example, prejudgment interest was

allowed on the amount due under a contract for the sale of sheep
as of the date of delivery, Jorgensen, supra; on the amount due
under an insurance policy as of the date of loss, Anderson v*
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978);
on amounts due under trust deed notes, Christensen v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 308 (Utah 1983);
and on the liquidated amount due under a settlement agreement,
Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985).
However, the premises and underlying purposes for
prejudgment interest do not exist in this case.

Mason seeks

prejudgment interest from the date of the original October 1982
judgment dismissing her action.

As of that date, it had been

judicially determined that Mason had incurred no loss as a result
of Western's disbursements.

Thus, not only were the extent, the
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calculability, and the liability for the claimed loss uncertain,
but the very fact of a loss had been judicially disproves
Moreover, since it was determined at that time that Western owed
Mason no obligation, Western engaged in no unjust or unreasonable
delay in satisfying the obligation.

Mason's loss and Western's

liability therefor were not established until this Court's
decision in Mason I reversing the October 1982 judgment. The
extent and calculation of Mason's damages were not fixed until
the trial court's second, 1986 judgment following remand.
Therefore, it is evident that Mason is not entitled to
prejudgment interest under the existing authorities of this
Court.

Rather, the general rule applies to allow interest only

from the date of the January 1986 judgment.
This Court has apparently never addressed the precise
issue presented in this case of whether a judgment following
appellate remand bears interest from the date of its entry or
from the date of the prior adverse judgment that was reversed on
appeal.

However, the issue has been addressed by many other

*In Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 5 Utah 2d
379, 302 P.2d 712 (1956), the Court held that its judgment
reversing a directed verdict merely reinstated or
"vitalized" the jury's verdict for the appellant; therefore,
interest properly ran from the date of the original
judgment. However, in this case the original 1982 judgment
was for Western; thus; the Court's reversal of that judgment
^ n Mason I could not possibly be construed as "reinstating"
a nonexistent judgment for Mason.
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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state courts, which uniformly hold that judgment interest in such
cases runs only from the date of entry of the post-appeal
judgment.

This rule is well stated in the leading case of

Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, 55 Cal. 2d 439, 360 P.2d 76,
78 (1961):
A judgment bears legal interest from the date of its
entry in the trial court even though it is still subject to
direct attack. When a judgment is modified upon appeal,
whether upward or downward, the new sum draws interest from
the date of entry of the original order, not from the date
of the new judgment. On the other hand, when a judgment is
reversed on appeal the new award subsequently entered by the
trial court can bear interest only from the date of entry of
such new judgment. [Citations omitted, emp. added.]
The case of Yeager Garden Acres, Inc. v. Summit
Construction Co., 32 Colo. App. 242, 513 P.2d 458 (1973),
illustrates application of this rule on facts similar to those in
the present case.

There, a building owner sued the contractor

for breach of the construction contract and obtained a
judgment.

The appellate court affirmed liability, but reversed

the damage award and remanded for a new calculation of damages.
On remand the trial court entered judgment with interest from the
date of the original judgment.

On the second appeal the

appellate court reversed the interest award, holding that
interest on the judgment following remand could run only from the
date of that judgment.

The court reasoned that even though

liability was established in the original trial, damages remained
uncertain until the trial court's determination following remand,
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and "interest cannot be allowed on unliquidated claims." Id* at
461.

Moreover, since the extent of damages had not been

determined until after remand, the defendant could not be
considered in default for interest until that time.

See also

Morris v. Standard Oil Co., 192 Cal. 343, 219 P. 998, 1003 .
(1923).
Other cases on similar facts also allow interest only
from the date of the remand judgment on the basis that prior to
that time the extent of damages is uncertain.

For example, in

Cheshire v. Barbour, 481 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. App. 1972), the
plaintiff obtained a judgment on a contract for personal
services, but the judgment was reversed for inadequate proof of
damages.

On remand, the plaintiff obtained a second judgment,

with interest from the date of that judgment.

The plaintiff

appealed, claiming the right to interest from the date of the
first judgment.

However, the appellate court rejected the claim,

"the amount not being liquidated until the verdict of the jury"
following remand.

Id. at 279. Also, in Cockrill v. Cockrill,

139 Ariz. 72, 676 P.2d 1130 (App. 1983), the court held that it
was error for the trial court to award interest on a remand
judgment from the date of the original reversed judgment. The
appellate court reasoned that "it would be unfair to charge the
[defendant] interest when he could not have accurately determined
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what sum, if any, he would ultimately be held liable to pay,"
Id, , 676 P.2d at 1133.
Thus, the rule is uniformly applied that if a judgment
is reversed on appeal and the case is remanded for determination
of damages, the new judgment bears interest only from the date of
that judgment.

See, e.g., Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752,

519 P.2d 421, 431 (1974)? Resner v. Northern Pacific Railway, 161
Mont. 177, 505 P.2d 86, 92 (1973)? Varney v. Taylor, 81 N.M. 87,
463 P.2d 511 (1969)? Tome Land & Imp. Co. v. Silva, 86 N.M. 87,
519 P.2d 1024, 1028 (1973)? Zegman v. State, 99 Misc. 2d 473, 416
N.Y.S.2d 505 (1979). £f_. Fulle v. Boulevard Excavating, Inc., 25
Wash. App. 520, 610 P.2d 387 (1980) (citing rule but concluding
that first judgment was only modified rather than reversed).

The

original judgment, having been reversed, is "wiped out" or
"extinguished," leaving no basis for the accrual of interest from
that judgment.

See, e.g., Rexnord, Inc. v. Ferris, 69 Or. App.

146, 684 P.2d 26 (1984)? Cowdery v. London & San Francisco Bank,
73 P. 196, 197 (Cal. 1903) (legal effect of reversing judgment). 2

z

In the rare case where the full extent of damages is
determined by the appellate court, leaving only the
ministerial entry of judgment for the trial court, interest
may run from the date of the appellate court's remittitur.
See, e^cj^, Rexnord, jsupra? Haskell v. Forest Land and Timber
Co. , 426 So.2d 1251, 1254" (Fla. App". 1983]"." "irT'the" present"
case, however, damages were not determined until remand.
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Application of this rule is equally compelling in the
present case.

Here, neither Western's liability nor Mason's loss

was established until this Court's decision in Mason I.

That

decision reversed and extinguished the 1982 judgment in favor of
Western, but left the extent of Mason's damages uncertain.

This

Court did not calculate the damages; rather, it remanded for the
trial court to determine what portion of the unauthorized
disbursements was used for Mason's benefit.

Only after that

determination could the extent of Mason's loss be fixed.

Until

that determination, Western could not be said to have been in
default or to have unreasonably delayed in paying the
obligation.

Moreover, this Court's mandate in Mason I made no

mention of judgment interest.

Therefore, the trial court had no

authority or legal basis to award interest on Mason's 1986
judgment from the date of Western's 1982 judgment.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in awarding judgment interest
from beyond the date of entry of Mason's January 1986 judgment.
Therefore, that portion of the court's judgment must be reversed.
Dated this

i^t-day of September, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

By <S^J$?^

^<k^X_

Gregory S. Bell #0275
David M. Wahlquist #3349
Merrill F. Nelson #3841
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

' • '*•' > •

STATE OF UTAH

Civil No. 49,731

CLEO B. MASON,
Plaintiff,

D E C

ISION

WESTERN MORTGAGE
LOAN CORPORATION,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for trial on the 23rd day
of June, 1982, Jackson B. Howard, Esq** and Fred Howard, Esq.,
appearing for the plaintiff, and Gregory S. Bell, Esq. appearing
for the defendant.

The parties presented their evidence and the

Court having taken the matter undex-adviseraent, now enters its:
DECISION
The Court heard certain testimony subject to a Motion to
Strike by defendant who claimed that the evidence violates the
parole evidence rule in that it changes the terms of paragraphs 5
and 6 of Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 5. Although the plaintiff
claims that ambiguities existed in the two paragraphs which
require clarification and the assessment of the meaning the
parties intended to be given the paragraph, the Court concludes
that the evidence only went to establishing that which was stipulated to by defendant that it paid out over $15,000.00 on both
houses to the general contractor without the approval of the
plaintiff, and without requiring lien releases of him from
material suppliers or laborers. . The evidence showed also that
other sums had been paid without the approval of the plaintiff,
but they went to material suppliers or laborers who furnished
lien releases.

That testimony which sought to establish that no

funds were to be paid except on the written authorization of the
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plaintiff is stricken from the record and is not considered by
the Court in arriving at its Decision herein, since it would
vary the options provided the defendant under paragraph 5 to
make payments to one other than the Imdersignecf (plaintiff
herein) as long as such payments were for materials or labor.
The Court finds that it has been established that defendant
made payments as above-indicated to the contractor and that no
lien releases were given to show that these payments were for
materials or labor incorporated into either home, but the plaintiff has failed to prove that the above-mentioned payments to the •
contractor did not go to pay for material and labors performed on
the construction of each house, and has therefore failed in her
proof that she has suffered damage by reason of the disbursements
made by the defendant to the general contractor without plaintiff's
authorization.
Plaintiff's assertion that the defendant has the
burden of proving that the payments made to the contractor were
for materials and labor, and that without such proof plaintiff
should recover the amount of the unauthorized payments to the
contractor

has .no authority cited in support thereof*-'

The Court therefore concludes that the burden of proof on
damage remains with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has failed
to establish that the payments in question to the contractor
were diverted to some other purpose than the construction.
The Court therefore finds the issues in this case in favor
of- the defendant and against the plaintiff.

Counsel for the

defendant is directed to parepare appropriate Findings of Fact,
Concludions of Law and Judgment and Order of Dismissal herein.
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah this

*2^£,

day of July,

1982.
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Gregory S. Bell
GREGORY S. BELL & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendant
376 East 400 South, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, 0T 84111
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

1
CLEO B. MASON,
Plaintiff ,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v»
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN
CORPORATION,
Civil No. 49,731
Defendant.

J™
The above entitled matter came for trial on the 23rd
day of June, 1982.

Plaintiff was present and represented by

and through hei attorneys, Jackson B. Howard and Fred Howard.
Deiendaut was present and represented by and through its
attorney Gregory S. Bell.
The parties having presented their evidence and the
Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court; finds

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Defendant paid over $15,000.00 on two houses

^•..•f~i» by the Plaintiff to the general contractor who was
biuJuinvj said houses, which payments were made without the
approval of the Plaintiff and without requiring lien releases
from seme material, suppliers or laborers*
2.

The Plaintiff failed to prove that said payments

did not go to pay fcr material and labor used and performed
within the construction of the houses,
3.

The Defendant paid other sums to the general

contractor without the approval of the Plaintiff, but which

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

*

0

sums went to material suppliers or laborers who furnished lien
releases.
From the foregoing Findings of Facts, the Court now
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Any testimony which varied the options provided
the Defendant under paragraph 5 of the Building Loan Agreement
and Assignment of Account between Plaintiff and Defendant
dated January 19, 1977 to make payments to one another than
the "undersigned" (the Plaintiff herein) so long as such
payments were for materials or labor is stricken from the
record and is not considered by the Court, in that said
evidence is not admissable as parol evidence.
2*

The Plaintiff had the burden of proving that the

payments made to the contractor by the Defendant were not
used to pay for material or labor and the Plaintiff failed
to prove the same.
3.

uy virtue of said failure, the Plaintiff failed

to prove that she had been damaged by the Defendant's actions.
4. Plaintiff did not show or prove a basis upon
which attorneys' fees should be awarded to Plaintiff.
DA'j.'.O U- Prover Utah County, State of Utah, this
(£{

day of 0$*J~+Zji~

, 1982.
BY THE COURT:

^-^ri

<f $~JULS

George E. BjAllif
District Court Judge

^

Approved as to form:

Jackson Howard
Attorney for Plaintiff
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examine the State's expert witness in an were applied to the scheduled project purimproper manner.
suant to loan agreement
The convictions are affirmed.
—•———-—
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

Cleo B MASON, Plaintiff
and Appellant?
t•„

WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN
CORPORATION, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 18951.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 30, 1985.
Action was brought against lender
seeking recovery of damages for wrongful
disbursal of construction loan proceeds to
plaintiffs contractor. The Fourth District
Court Utah County, George E. Ballif, J.,
found that lender had breached loan agreement but ruled that plaintiff had failed to
establish that she had been damaged, and
plaintiff appealed The Supreme Court,
Zimmerman, J., held that plaintiff satisfied
her burden of proving damages.
Reversed and remanded.
Stewart, J.9 concurred in result
Damages *»189
Plaintiff satisfied her burden of proving damages in her action against lender
for wrongfully disbursing construction loan
proceeds to her contractor, where lender
disbursed nearly $29,000 in proceeds, and
where uncontradicted evidence indicated
that lender made no bona fide effort to
determine whether the disbursed funds

Jackson Howard, Prove, for plaintiff and
appellant
Gregory S. Bell and Lester A. Perry, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and respondent
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Plaintiff Mason appeals from the trial
court's dismissal of her claim against defendant Western Mortgage Loan Corporation for wrongfully disbursing construction
loan proceeds to her contractor. The trial
court found that Western had breached the
agreement, but ruled that Mason had failed
to establish that she had been damaged.
We reverse and remand for entry of judgment in Mason's favor.
In January of 1977, Mason and a building
contractor entered into an agreement for
the construction of two houses on two
building lots she owned. The contractor
had submitted itemised bids of $28,435 and
$25,724, respectively, for the two houses.
Simultaneously with the execution of the
construction contract, Mason entered into
two identical standard form loan agreements with Western under which Western
agreed to furnish Mason with funds for the
construction of the houses. The amounts
to be advanced under the two agreements
corresponded to the amounts set forth in
the two bids. The loan documents contemplated that the loan proceeds would be held
by Western and disbursed only for labor
and materials used to construct the houses
in accordance with the bids attached to the
loan agreements. The loans were secured
by the houses and the underlying real estate.
• ••' •
As construction proceeded, the contractor secured funds from Western by
presenting it with forms entitled "Contractor's Authorization for Payment" These
forms specified the amount to be drawn
from the loan proceeds and identified the
person or entity to whom payment was to
be made. During the first and last stages
of construction, these slips bore the signa-
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tures of both the contractor and Mason.
During the middle stages of the work, however, when most of the funds were disbursed, the slips were signed only by the
contractor.
Several months after construction began,
Mason was informed that all of the loan
proceeds had been disbursed. Ten to twenty-five percent of the work on the houses
remained to be done The contractor's insolvency prevented recovery against him.
Mason brought suit against Western, contending that Western had breached its contract with her by disbursing loan proceeds
to the contractor without her signature or
without adequate assurance that the proceeds were going into the houses, as required by the loan agreements.

ages. Once Mason established that Western had breached its contract with her by
disbursing nearly $29,000 in violation of the
loan agreements, she had adduced sufficient proof to support an award of damages in that amount To avoid all or any
part of this liability, Western had to show
that some or all of the money it paid directly to the contractor in violation of the loan
agreements actually was disbursed for
work done or materials furnished and incorporated into the two houses. The Ian*
guage of the standard form agreements
that Western used to state the terms of its
bargain with Mason dictates this result

We hold, as a matter of law, that Mason
had satisfied her burden of proving dam-

Under the terms of the loan contracts,
Mason borrowed funds from Western to be
used solely in constructing the two houses.
Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the agree-rnents, Western retained the funds and
agreed that it would disburse them "from
time to time as the construction of the
improvements progress[ed] in accordance
with [the contractor's itemized bids] attached hereto, in amounts respectively
equal to the value of the labor and materials actually incorporated in the improvements
" Western retained the right to
disburse these funds either to Mason for
payment to others or, at its option, directly
to contractors, materialmen, or laborers.
However, consistent with the underlying
purpose of the contract, all such disbursements were to be only "for work done or
labor furnished in connection with such improvements/' l
Even if the language of paragraph 5
were less clear, a review of the whole
agreement leaves no real question as to
Western's duties in disbursing the loan proceeds. Had Western released the funds to
Mason, she could have taken appropriate
steps to ensure that the funds were dis-

1. Paragraph 5 of the two standard form construction loan agreements provides as follows:
5. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Account shall be disbursed by the
Lender from time to time as the construction
of the improvements progress) es] in accordance with (the contractor's itemized bids], in
amounts respectively equal to the value of the
labor and materials actually incorporated in

the improvements since the date construction
commenced or since the date of the immediately preceding disbursement from the Account, as the case may be. Such disbursements may be made to [Mason], or, at the
option of the Lender, may be made to contractors, materialmen and laborers, or any of
them, for work done or labor furnished in
connection with such improvements.

At trial, Mason argued that the houses
would have been constructed within the bidlimit if her authorization had been required
on all payment slips or, at least,, that she
would have been in a position to enforce or
renegotiate the bids with her contractor.
She introduced evidence that nearly $29,000 of the $54,159 loaned had been disbursed to the contractor and the subcontractors at the contractor's sole request
and approval. Mason conceded that some
portion of this $29,000 was used in constructing the houses, but argued that because of Western's breach it was impossible for her to ascertain with any reasonable
degree of accuracy what portion of these
funds was wrongfully disbursed. The trial
court found that Western had breached its
agreements with Mason, but dismissed her
claim because she was unable to show what
portion of the proceeds had gone into the
two houses and what portion had been otherwise diverted.
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bursed only for work actually done on the
houses Indeed, under paragraph 6 of the
agreement, Mason had rather extensive
record keeping and other obligations that
were specifically designed to assure Western that, in fact, the funds were going into
the project Construing the terms of paragraph S in light of the purpose of the
contract, it is clear that when Western opted to make payments directly to the contractor or other suppliers, it had an obligation, parallel to Mason's obligation under
paragraph 6, to ensure that the funds it
disbursed were for work done or materials
furnished and incorporated into the houses.
For just as Western had a legitimate, contractual right to assure itself that the loan
proceeds actually were incorporated into
the premises securing the loan, Mason had
an equally strong contractual right to assure herself that the proceeds were dis>
bursed only for the purpose contemplated
by the loan documents. The uncontradicted evidence indicates that Western made no
bona fide effort to determine whether the
disbursed funds were applied to the scheduled project
In Movie Films, Inc. v. First Security
Bank 22 Utah 2d 1, 447 P.2d 38 (1968), we
dealt with an analogous factual situation.
There, a bank had agreed to disburse funds
from a corporation's account only when the
checks were signed by both the corporate
president and the vice president The bank
then paid several checks bearing only the
president's signature. In affirming a judgment against the bank, we held that the
bank's failure to comply with the terms of
the agreement entitled the plaintiff to re2» In Movie films, the Court said that any contcn
tion that the corporation benefited by the
wrongful disbursement of funds was an affirmative defense upon which the bank bore the
burden of proof. 22 Utah 2d at 4, 447 P.2d at
40. This statement is not entirely correct. The
bank did not assert that the corporation failed
to mitigate its damages. Mitigation of damages
is an affirmative defense. Pratt v. Board of

cover the funds wrongfully disbursed; if
the bank disputed the corporation's claim
for damages, it was required to go forward
with the evidence to establish that the
funds wrongfully disbursed were actually
applied to the corporation's benefit 22
Utah 2d at 4, 447 P.2d at 40.*
These principles apply equally to the instant case. Western bore the burden of
establishing that the wrongfully disbursed
funds were used for Mason's benefit
Therefore, the trial court should have entered judgment in Mason's favor in the
amount of the funds wrongfully disbursed
to the contractor less any amount Mason
conceded or the bank established was used
to her benefit
Because we have resolved the issues in
this case based on the language of the
contract, we need not consider Mason's
claim that the trial court improperly excluded parol evidence.
The matter is reversed and remanded to
the trial court for entry of judgment in
Mason's favor in the amount of damages
established at trial. Costs to appellant
HALJU CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM,
JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
J7\

5>
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Education, Utah, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (1977).
Rather, the bank only disputed the corporation's
damage claim. While the bank did have the
burden of going forward with the evidence to
show that plaintiffs harm was not as great as its
proof tended to show, it did not carry a "burden
of proof* because it was not asserting an affirmative defense.
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FRED D. HOWARD, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 Eatt 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CLEO B. MASON,
Plaintiff,

|
I
|

JUDGMENT

I
I

vs.

WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN
CORPORATION,
Defendant.

I

|
|

Civil No. 49,731

t

The above-entitled matter came on trial on the 23rd day of June, 1982.

The

plaintiff was present and represented by her attorneys, Jackson Howard and Fred D.
Howard.

Defendant was present and represented by its attorney, Gregory S. BclL

The parties presented
premises.

their evidence and the Court was fully

advised

in the

The Court has heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law and did thereafter enter a Judgment and Order of Dismissal as against the
plaintiff.

This matter was appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

which reversed and remanded to the trial court entry of this Judgment with reversal
of that Judgment heretofore entered on the 1st day of February, 1983. Judgment is,
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therefore, duly entered in favor of the plaintiff as follows:
Principal:

$15,380,00

Accrued Interest:

6,789.86

Attorneys i ccs

x i n n AA
T^jyv.W

Accrued Court Costs:

.

279,59

TOTAL JUDGMENT:

ffltJ^CJflPJHHCSl £f^

/2.2-vyf. v r

DATED at Provo, Utah, this Z'9

u

5-^.

day of January, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

GEORGE E.
District Court Judge

fr^LLIF~F
/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hei ebj certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing wgc mailed

/ +k,

to the following, postage prepaid, this LP

day of January, 1986.

Mr. Gregory S. Bell
Mr. Lester A. Perry
Kirton, McConkie & Bushncil
Attorneys for Defendant
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
July 30, 1986
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Gregory S. Bell, Esq.
Oauid M. Wahlquist, Esq.
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
r *

Cleo B. Mason,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
u.
Western Mortgage Loan Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

No. 860130

THIS DAY, Appellant's motion to reverse the judgment appealed in
this matter is hereby denied.
Respondent's motion to affirm the judgment is granted in part
and d&nied in part. Most of the issues raised mere previously
raised and settled in Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corporation,
705 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1985). The judgment is affirmed concerning
those issues, as the Court properly followed the mandate of this
Court.
Appellant is limited to the issue of whether the trial court
properly allowed interest from the date of the entry of the previous
judgment.
Appellant's brief is due Aug. 30, 1986.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15-1-2

CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL

15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed.
Repeals. — Sections 15-1-2, 15-l-2a (L.
1907, ch. 46, § 2; C.L. 1907, § 1241x; C.L.
1917, § 3321; R.S. 1933,44-0-2; L. 1935, ch. 42,
§ 1; C. 1943, 44-0-2; L. 1953, ch. 24, §§ 1, 2;

1955, ch. 20, § 1; 1965, ch. 25, § 1), relating to
maximum interest rates on loans and conditional sales contracts, were repealed by Laws
1969, ch. 18, § 9.103.

15-1-3, Calculated by the year.
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or verbal contract, or in any
public or private instrument whatever, any certain rate of interest is mentioned and no period of time is stated, interest shall be calculated at the rate
mentioned by the year.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 7; C X . 1907,
§ 1241x5; C.L. 1917, § 3328; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 44-0-3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

-: - '• •••

C.J.S. — 47 C.J.S. Interest § 42.
Key Numbers* — Interest *» 40.

15-1-4. Interest on judgments.
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and shall
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the
judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
History: L. 1907, ch* 46, § 11; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241x9; C.L. 1917, § 3330: R.S« 1933 & C.
1943, 44-0-4; L* 1981, ch. 73, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amendment increased the interest rate from 8% to
12%.

Cross-References. — Interest to be ineluded in judgment entry, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Allowance of interest before judgment.
Amendment of judgment.
Collection of interest.
Eminent domain.
Estates of decedents.
Federal court judgment.
Interest during pendency of appeal.
Late payment of property division in divorce action.
Personal judgments.
Prejudgment interest.
Reinstatement of judgment.
Renewal of judgment.

744
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Rule 54

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 54

(d) Costs.
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs;
provided, however, where an appeal or other proceedings for review is
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the
cause. Costs against the State of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be
imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How Assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days
after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom
costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and
necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily
incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e* Interest and Costs to Be Included in the Judgment The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
Cross reference. As to costs on appeals, see
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure set out
elsewhere in this volume.
I. General Consideration.
II. Multiple Claims and'or Parties.
III. Demand for Judgment.
A. Generally.
B. Specific Cases.
IV. Costs.
A. Generally.
B. To Whom Awarded.
C. Memorandum of Costs.
D. Interest.

100
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Rule 32

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 33

(e) Precedential Effect Appeals decided under this Rule will not stand as
precedent of the Court, but, in other respects, will have the same force and
effect as other decisions of the Court.
(f) Issuance of Written Opinion. If it appears to the Court after the case has
been submitted for decision that a written opinion should be issued, the time
limitation in paragraph (d) shall not apply and the parties will be so notified.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
uncomplicated issues of fact and/or relatively
well-settled issues of law. Paragraph (b) delineates the type and nature of cases which are
eligible for expedited treatment.
Paragraph (el Cases tried by the Court
under this Rule are not to be considered as
precedent for any legal issue determined and
will not be considered within the body or
principal of law, as stare decisis, of the Court.
However, a decision under this Rule will have
the effects of res judicata, collateral estoppel or
other construction applied to particular decisions under written opinions of the Court.

There is no prior appellate rule in Utah
authorizing an expedited appeal without written opinion of the Court. The Rule is designed
to get at and expeditiously dispose of appeals
which qualify for expedited treatment as defined in paragraph (b) and as to which both
parties expressly stipulate it may be considered.
Paragraph (h). It is not intended that this
Rule be construed to supplant the ordinary
calendaring of cases or issuance of written
opinions by the Court. See Rule 30. Rather, its
purpose is to aid in disposing of cases involving

Rnle 32. Interest on Judgment.
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date
the judgment was entered in the district court.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
There is no prior rule of appellate practice
governing interest on money judgments. This
Rule clarifies the date interest is calculated on
money judgments that are affirmed by the

Court, viz., the date the judgment was entered
in the district court. The Rule is, in part,
similar to Rule 37 FRAP,

Rule 33. Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal; Recovery of Attorney's Fees.
ta) Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal If the Court shall determine
that a motion made or appeal taken under these Rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double costs, including
reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party.
(b) Disciplinary Action for Inadequate Representation. The Court may take
appropriate disciplinary action against counsel who inadequately represents
his client on appeal.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This Rule is designed to ensure that parties
and their counsel understand that frivolous or

clearly unmentorious appeals may result in
the imposition of single or double costs, includ-
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Rule 3 i.

Interest on Judgments
Unless otherwise provide.! by law. if a judgment
for money in a civil ease is affirmed, whatever
interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the
date the judgment was entered in the district court.
If a judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the
district court, the mandate shall contain instructions
with respect to allowance of interest.
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
APPELLATE RULES
The first sentence makes it clear that if a money judgment is affirmed in the court of appeals, the interest which
attaches to money judgments by force of law (see 28
U.S.C. § 1961 and § 2411) upon their initial entry is payable as if no appeal had been taken, whether or not the
mandate makes mention of interest There has been some
confusion on this point. See Blair v. Durham, 139 F.2d
260 (6th Cir., 1943) and cases cited therein.
In reversing or modifying the judgment of the district
court, the court of appeals may direct the entry of a
money judgment, as, for example, when the court of
appeals reverses a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and directs entry of judgment on the verdict. In such a
case the question may arise as to whether interes' is to
run from the date of entry of the judgment directed by the
court of appeals or from the date on which the judgment
would have been entered in the district court except for
the erroneous ruling corrected on appeal. In Briggs v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed.
1403 (1948), the Court held that where the mandate of the
court of appeals directed entry of judgment upon a verdict
but made no mention of interest from the date_pf the
verdict to the date of the entry of the judgment directed
by the mandate, the district court was powerless to add
such interest. The second sentence of the proposed rule is
a reminder to the court, the clerk and counsel of the
Briggs rule. Since the rule directs that the matter of
interest be disposed of by the mandate, in cases where
interest is simply overlooked, a party who conceives himself entitled to interest from a date other than the date of
entry of judgment in accordance with the mandate should
be entitled to seek recall of the mandate for determination
of the question.

awards are distinct and independent Interest is provide;
for by law; damages are awarded by the court in its
discretion in the case of a frivolous appeal as a matter of
justice to the appellee and as a penalty against the appellant.

Rule 39. Costs

(a) To Whom Allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shali
be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise
agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a
judgment is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against
the appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the
appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment is
affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs
shall be allowed only as ordered by the court.
(b) Costs For and Against the United States, In
cases involving the United States or an agency or
officer thereof, if an award of costs against the
United States is authorized by law, costs shall be
awarded in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (a); otherwise, costs shall not be awarded for
or against the United States,
(c) Costs of Briefs, Appendices, and Copies of
Records. By local rule the court of appeals shall
fix the maximum rate at which the cost of printing
or otherwise producing necessary copies of briefs,
appendices, and copies of records authorized by
Rule 30(f) shall be taxable. Such rate shall not: be
higher than that generally charged for such work in
the area where the clerk's office is located and shall
encourage the use of economical methods of printing and copying.
(d) Bill of Costs; Objections; Costs to be Inserted in Mandate or Added Later. A party who
R u l e 38. Damages for Deiay
desires such costs to be taxed shall state them in an
itemized and verified bill of costs which the party
If a court of appeals shall determine that an
shall file with the clerk, with proof of service,
appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and
within 14 days after the entry of judgment. Objecsingle or double costs to the appellee.
tions
to the bill of costs must be filed within 10 days
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
of service on the party against whom costs are to be
APPELLATE RULES
taxed unless the time is extended by the court. The
Compare 2fc U.S.C. § 1912. While both the statute and
clerk
shall prepare and certify an itemized statethe usual rule on the subject by courts of appeals (Fourth
ment
of costs taxed in the court of appeals for
Circuit Rule 20 is a typical rule) speak of "damages for
insertion in the mandate, but the issuance of the
delay/' the courts of appeals quite properly allow dammandate shall not be delayed for taxation of costs
ages, attorney's fees and other expenses incurred by an
and if the mandate has been issued before final
appellee if the appeal is frivolous without requiring a
showing that the appeal resulted in delav. See Dundetermination of costs, the statement, or any
srombe v. Sayle, 340 F.2d 311 (f>th Cir., 1965), cert, den,, amendment thereof, shall be added to the mandate
:W2 U.S. 814. 86 S.Ct. 32. 15 L Ed.2d 62 (1965); Lour v.
upon request by the clerk of the court of appeals to
Willacy. 231) F.2d ITU <»th Cir., 1956); Gn/fUh Wellpoint the clerk of the district court.
Corp. v. Munro-Lanqstroth, Inc., 269 F.2d 64 (1st Cir..
(e) Costs on Appeal Taxable in the District
1959); Ginsburg v. Stern, 295 F.2d 698 (3d Cir., 1961)
Courts. Costs incurred in the preparation and
The subjects of interest and damages are separately regulated, contrary to the present practice of combining the
transmission of the record, the cost of the reporter's
tu<» (see Fourth Circuit Rule 20) to make it clear that the
transcript, if necessary for the determination of tinComptott Annotation Motor no, too TMo 28 U.S.C.A.
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